Lavrov on Gaza and Hormuz UN plans and Islamabad deal

Jun 17

After questions about Trump's rejection of Iran's seven-day proposal and the unimplemented Gaza arrangements under Security Council resolution 2803, Lavrov criticizes what he regards as unfulfilled resolutions and Western hidden agendas. He recalls resolution 1244 on Kosovo and says its guarantees have not been observed. He then recalls the Quartet Road Map and a resolution intended to produce Palestinian statehood; on air he cannot remember its name and tentatively places it in the mid-1990s. His chronology and recollection remain attributed. Discussing resolution 2803, he says Russia and China abstained because the draft gave the UN no meaningful role, but Arab states and Palestinians asked them not to veto it. Returning explicitly to Iran, he describes the Islamabad memorandum signed at the highest level as a fair arrangement and asks why the parties cannot return to it. He does not equate the earlier memorandum with the newly rejected seven-day proposal or announce an accepted agreement, deployed force or reopened strait.

Fox's Jack Keane recalls a memorandum signed by Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian that included reopening Hormuz. He alleges that Iran breached it within four or five days and uses that claim to argue against relying on a new deal. The segment does not independently establish the breach; his characterization of the agreement's scope is an analyst's account. In the September 23 interview, Bessent recalls giving an MOU a try on June 3 and alleges that Iran began firing on ships weeks later. He uses the experience to argue that future concessions must be durable. His reference to June 3 is not a new verified signing date: the documented signing remains June 17, while contemporary June 3 reporting described an emerging memorandum. The different chronology and compliance descriptions remain attributed. In his September 24 Fox interview, Pezeshkian says the signed June framework remains a basis for agreement and describes a planned joint team to resolve misunderstandings that was never established. He says the accord allowed 60 days for talks and criticizes its disruption after roughly two weeks. Baier counters that IRGC attacks on ships and a Qatari tanker undermined the deal, and questions the civilian leadership's ability to guarantee compliance. Yingst endorses the breach account. These competing explanations and varied time references are retained; they do not establish a new agreement or independently settle responsibility. In CBS interview excerpts recorded September 25 and relayed by IRINN on September 26, Pezeshkian says an agreed Iran–Oman route required coordination and blames passage without that coordination for confrontation. He says Iran will comply if the agreed framework is respected. This additional Iranian explanation is retained alongside the Fox interview and U.S. accounts attributing failure to Iranian attacks; responsibility remains disputed. Oman TV's Saeed Shehata says the latest Iranian demands seek compliance with the June memorandum rather than new concessions. He describes blockade and oil-sanctions relief, release of frozen assets, nuclear discussion and reopening Hormuz as a basis for renewed diplomacy. He argues that mediators should seize this opening despite Iran's economic weakness. This is his interpretation of the existing framework, alongside the preserved U.S. and Iranian disagreements over past compliance. Fox's September 28 discussion again contrasts Pezeshkian's account that the MOU's coordinating team was never formed with Hume's allegation that Iran violated the framework almost immediately. Hume also questions whether Pezeshkian controls the IRGC. This is a replay and new analysis of the existing June framework, not a new memorandum or a resolution of disputed compliance. In Oman News’s September 29 live discussion, Mohammed Jawad says Tehran seeks a return to the Pakistan-mediated Islamabad memorandum. He interprets its first clause as requiring an end to war on all fronts, including Lebanon, and warns, attributing the view to Iranian leaders, that Lebanese or other regional escalation could harm diplomacy. This supplements the pro-return account of the existing memorandum; the claimed scope remains attributed and no new agreement is established. Lavrov's September 26 press conference calls the Islamabad memorandum a fair arrangement signed at the highest level and asks why the parties cannot return to it. This adds a Russian diplomatic assessment favoring the earlier framework, without a new agreement or a settled explanation of its breakdown. Review of Keane's complete answer clarifies that his breach allegation underpins opposition to any new agreement and support for economic/military pressure aimed at regime collapse. This substantive position remains distinct from administration assurances that a new deal can be enforced. Tagesthemen's October 5 Bandar Abbas interview adds Weber's account that ending hostilities, lifting sanctions and freeing frozen assets were agreed in June but the United States did not comply. He describes Iranian interest in a settlement alongside threats and mistrust. This is a further attributed account of the existing framework and its contested compliance, not a new memorandum or a resolution of responsibility; the later Qatar reply's precise identity is not established. Oman TV's October 5 discussion adds Abdulrahman Al Salhi's view that Pakistan seeks UN recognition and international legitimacy for the Islamabad framework, along with support for implementation and verification. Mohammad Javad again describes Tehran's demand for a return to the memorandum before nuclear talks and an end on all fronts. Al Salhi refers to June 18 of 'last June' in the Arabic source; an English cue mistranslates this as 'last year'. His day reference remains attributed and does not supersede the existing documented June 17 signing date. No new memorandum or agreed verification mechanism is established.