Baldy questions Russia risk NATO, China and hybrid acts

Oct 5

In Baldy’s complete first-round question slot, Jäger explains that 2029 remains NATO’s conditional defence-planning reference, but that the BND sees no current indication of a large-scale Russian NATO attack. He considers limited incursions and testing of allied responses plausible now and invokes cross-border drones and the 2014 “little green men” as examples, not announcements of an imminent invasion. Asked about reported Chinese weapons in Russian use, he says Russia depends heavily on Chinese assistance but sees no systematic, comprehensive Chinese military intervention comparable with North Korea’s; he also describes limits China sets. Asked whether Russian operations in Germany are becoming narrower, Selen says methods and targets are expanding, existing tools continue and organized crime can supplement low-level agents. He says destabilizing Germany and the West extends beyond Ukraine. The account preserves the questions, conditional forecasts and distinction between reported weapon sightings and a changed Chinese policy.

At the public Berlin oversight hearing, BND president Martin Jäger warns that confrontation with Russia has become more dangerous and that Germany risks violent conflict. BfV president Sinan Selen describes threats of sabotage and killings against transport, defense industry and military infrastructure, including possible civilian victims. In Tagesthemen's live clarification, Kornmeier says the chiefs nevertheless gave no indication that Russia plans an attack on NATO territory. These are attributed risk assessments, not a confirmed impending attack. Tagesschau's earlier October 5 package adds Martina Rosenberg calling the incidents concrete attacks on Germany, with an inaudible word left uncertain, and links Russia's targeting of Germany to German support for Ukraine. Jäger's Leipzig example and Selen's espionage/sabotage/assassination warning remain attributed official assessments. Tagesthemen's express absence of an indication of a planned NATO-territory attack remains intact. At the October 5 Berlin PKGr hearing, Jäger, Rosenberg and Selen describe concrete threats to Germany and Russian attempts to intimidate society and disrupt Ukraine support, transport, defence production and military infrastructure. Jäger calls the confrontation an undeclared shadow war; Selen describes expansion rather than replacement of espionage, sabotage, low-level agents and possible organized-crime methods. Rosenberg reports persistent military-site drone activity but says troops remain vigilant rather than demonstrably intimidated. In questioning, the chiefs advocate credible deterrence, public resilience and international cooperation. These are their attributed threat assessments and operational explanations, not confirmation of every suspected drone’s origin or an announced state of defence.