Baldy questions capabilities Attribution, MAD and space

Oct 5

Baldy asks whether delayed Russian attribution in the Signal-phishing and Leipzig cases reflects thoroughness or capability gaps. Selen describes dependence on partner services for technical detection and disruption, incomplete access to how intelligence products were generated and consequent delays; he explicitly treats the cited cases as hypothetical examples rather than confirming their precise mechanisms. Rosenberg explains the new MAD law’s practical effect in Lithuania: a permanent MAD office, protection beyond the former mission-and-installation limits, cooperation with the local AOTD, expanded instruments and relaxation of the old dual Bundeswehr nexus, alongside Constitutional Court requirements and coordination with other German services. Finally Jäger says the BND monitors developments in space, particularly China, Russia and the United States, works closely with the Bundeswehr and briefs the government. The exchange establishes assessments and cooperation, not the deployment alleged in the question about foreign space weapons.

At the October 5 German intelligence oversight hearing, the government's proposed active countermeasures are discussed, with examples of disabling weapons or hacker servers. Konstantin von Notz questions replacing domestic police action and judicial warrants with secret intelligence operations, invoking Germany's historical experience. Jäger says the new powers would be used and opponents would feel them. The report establishes a public debate and pledge, not legislative adoption. At the October 5 hearing the chiefs advocate operational, technical and organizational reform, presenting BND and BfV drafts as means to detect and avert threats and cooperate on European partner standards. Jäger describes desired data retention, sharing, cyber and joint prevention powers; Selen describes device-based investigation and conditional intervention against imminent serious state or international-terrorism threats. They welcome independent and parliamentary oversight and stress dependence on foreign capabilities under the current framework. Rosenberg relates the enacted MAD changes to further needs. Eichwede insists stronger powers require stronger rights protections and oversight. Von Notz challenges police coordination, immediate information-sharing qualifications and constitutionality, predicts Karlsruhe review and says the proposed oversight is not yet sufficiently apparent. These disagreements, narrow conditions and future tense are preserved; no draft is treated as enacted or judicially approved.