Primakov world-order panel Forecasts and disagreements

Jun 24

The complete June 24 Primakov Readings Session IV in Moscow contains the stage introductions, Peskov's opening, four presentations with moderator follow-ups, shared security and BRICS discussions, audience interventions and closing replies. Peskov diagnoses weakening international institutions and reserve-currency dominance, asks whether transformation is becoming chaos, and cites demographic and technological uncertainty, including forecasts of world population decline before mid-century. Saran outlines resources, technology, demography and identity as drivers of four potentially coexisting scenarios: prolonged U.S.–China rivalry between quasi-hegemons, civilizational groupings, fragmentation and overlapping pluralistic coordination. He argues that Iran and an insecure Hormuz demonstrate the limits of U.S. hegemony, distinguishes bombing power from imposing political will and favors a balancing/development role for India and cooperation with Russia. Slezkine challenges a simple nation-state alternative to universal liberalism, offers a historical empire-and-migration narrative and expects diverse political forms. He recounts a Western view of the Soviet breakup as the end of an empire and liberation of successor republics, specifically Lithuania and Latvia, rather than supplying an agreed causal history. In Peskov's question and his reply, he says the United States will remain a hegemonic empire while hoping it uses its capabilities differently. Sakwa distinguishes the UN Charter international system from competing world-order models, criticizes power-centered methodology and advocates a nonhegemonic plural order within an improved UN system. In the follow-up he predicts gradual Atlantic fragmentation and Western European stagnation. Peskov and Sakwa say an autonomous European defence identity would consolidate around hostility to Russia; their forecasts are not European decisions. Kislitsyn forecasts technology-led power, concentrated research capacity and politically conditional access to AI, citing a UN mid-century population estimate of 9.5 billion rather than Peskov's decline forecast. He rejects a straightforward Cold War-style bipolarity, emphasizes bridging states and stronger public administration, and argues that companies may preserve practical international rules while sovereign states retain regulation. He attributes potential Hormuz-related growth losses of up to 1% for the U.S., 2% for China and 3% for South Korea to the Peterson Institute. He expects the crisis to encourage renewables; Peskov instead predicts persistent reliance on hydrocarbons for technological power demand. The security exchange preserves disagreement. Peskov calls nuclear deterrence protection against global war. Saran describes institutional paralysis, supplementary bodies, private/asymmetric weapons and more below-threshold conflict. Sakwa claims the West Asian war demonstrates carrier vulnerability and diminishing returns to costly weapons, urges Council membership for India, Brazil and other states, and says alternatives cannot replace the UN system. He argues deterrence no longer deters but rejects a nuclear shock and calls for strategic patience. Slezkine also rejects a nuclear shock, discusses cheaper technologies and qualifies his expertise; Peskov counters that deterrence works. Kislitsyn expects a gray period in which cooperation bypasses institutions while the UN still performs useful work. On BRICS, Saran asks whether rising members would resist an internal hegemon. Kislitsyn favors an anti-bloc without permanent bureaucracy; Slezkine says the United States must remain part of any world-order formula. Saran describes BRICS as coordination rather than a bloc, while Sakwa favors more institutional development and gradual de-dollarization. Peskov rejects the claim that BRICS plans an alternative currency, explaining increased national-currency payments by members facing reserve-currency restrictions. An unidentified audience participant offers a petro-state/electro-state contrast and recalls Trump's Venezuelan-oil remarks without identifying the original address. Peskov wishes British–Russian disagreements were similarly calm. Kozinets then asks about technological imperialism. Saran warns that developing societies' data should not finance their own dependence; Slezkine locates new hierarchies partly in virtual spaces, and Peskov describes opposition to revived colonialism. Historical narratives, empirical figures, causal claims, conflicting forecasts and prescriptions remain attributed to their speakers. No new international institution, reform, common currency, security agreement or predicted future is established by the panel.

In the June 24 Primakov panel's exchange about unipolarity, Saran argues that events in Iran and the inability of even the strongest power to open and secure Hormuz show that a unipolar world no longer exists. He distinguishes destructive bombing power from the ability to impose a will on large nations and describes today's leading powers as quasi-hegemons. He also places the end of unipolarity in the financial crisis he calls the 2007 crisis. These are his political interpretation and chronology; the exchange establishes no new military operation, reopening or settlement.