Medvedev on equal states Legal programme and answers

Feb 24, 2022

In his complete opening address and two immediate follow-up answers, Dmitry Medvedev argues that sovereign equality should replace what he portrays as Western privilege. His historical survey links unequal treatment, colonialism, financial institutions and human-rights double standards to today's conflicts; these are his interpretations. He recounts Plessy v. Ferguson and uses its segregation doctrine as an analogy for Western attitudes. His programme calls for legal mechanisms to dismantle Western overseas bases, regional security arrangements, colonial reparations and recognition of colonialism as a crime against humanity. Recalling Russia's 2022 military action, he alleges Western militarization and threats from Ukraine and invokes Article 51 as its justification. On a Ukraine settlement he urges dealing with sponsors and alleges diminished Ukrainian sovereignty and Zelensky's lack of legitimacy, but explicitly says these claims do not prevent negotiations or formal agreements through parliamentary or direct-democratic mechanisms. He offers court cases as evidence that international law sometimes works, characterizing the coastal-rights arbitration as a unanimous Russian victory and referring to June 15 as the ruling date. He describes Russia's legal countermeasures, a register, reciprocal asset-seizure preparations and a law permitting military rescue of unlawfully detained Russians abroad. He announces planned ICJ applications against Baltic states after what he says was completion of the pre-litigation stage in May, and warns ICC enforcement against Russia could lead to war. He advocates applying existing legal models and a stable balance rather than institutional overthrow. In the full answers, he calls international law an exception worth striving for, distinguishes UN sanctions from unilateral restrictions Russia will not recognize, and leaves open legal and other countermeasures. His allegations, legal conclusions and forecasts remain attributed; the address announces neither a peace agreement nor completed Baltic filings.

Russia's February 24, 2022 attack on Ukraine is revisited in the retrieved accounts. Köppel calls the attack on a smaller neighbor and forcible border changes impermissible, says Putin underestimated the backlash and overestimated Russia, and nevertheless assigns causal responsibility to Western NATO expansion while warning against forcing a nuclear power to surrender. In a separate October 6 editorial return, he contrasts military punishment of the breach with accepting it and finding an agreement, while noting a similar peace preference on the far left. In her June 7, 2022 interview, Merkel calls the February 24 attack brutal, illegal and without justification. She reflects on the failure to build a preventive security architecture and explains her caution over the 2008 NATO bids while expressly rejecting that history as a justification for the invasion. Both condemn the attack; their causal and policy judgments remain distinct and attributed. Köppel's October 7 account again condemns Russia's invasion as an international-law breach, rejects an innocent-West framing and argues for compromise rather than forcing a nuclear power to surrender. His later retrospective invokes the 2014 Crimea dispute and what he describes as hostility toward Russian-speakers as causal background, with non-justification and present-day Ukraine qualifications. These are his interpretations, retained alongside Merkel's distinct assessment. Medvedev's June 24, 2026 retrospective alleges Western militarization and threats from Ukraine, invokes Article 51 and presents the February 2022 launch as necessary self-defense after failed alternatives. This opposed legal and causal account is preserved alongside Merkel and Köppel. In his October 8 commentary, Köppel questions an unequivocal unlawful-aggression classification and advances minority-assistance, self-determination and preemptive-war arguments. He portrays Putin as defensive and blames Western policy and alleged mistreatment of Russian-speakers, while acknowledging Putin's miscalculations, his own earlier criticism of the invasion and Russia's shared responsibility. This legal challenge differs materially from his earlier express condemnation; neither position is rewritten or treated as an established legal finding.