Köppel on Merz and the EU Questions invasion's law

Feb 24, 2022

Roger Köppel argues that EU leaders are exploiting the Ukraine war and anti-Russian rhetoric to concentrate power and restrict dissent, democracy and national sovereignty. He invokes Orbán's peace mission, alleges a Magyar-led purge and effective closure of Mathias Corvinus Collegium, criticizes Jacques Baud's sanctions and unspecified consideration of an AfD ban, and objects to a newly discussed EU mechanism for withdrawing national voting rights. He portrays the latter as a route to French and German dominance; these are his claims and political judgments, without a reported vote withdrawal or party ban. Köppel criticizes Friedrich Merz's recent Kyiv appearance with Zelenskyy, his accusatory appeals toward Russia and their remembrance of fallen soldiers. He says Tagesthemen imagery showed a Wolfsangel and later also a skull symbol, but expressly qualifies that he may have seen the screen incorrectly and that the image still needs to be isolated. He contrasts the visit with German wartime crimes and a German education minister's Babyn Yar remembrance, estimates about a million Jewish victims on Ukrainian soil and alleges present Ukrainian glorification of Bandera and Melnyk. His symbol identifications and collaboration, glorification and motive claims are not independently established by this monologue. He also criticizes NIUS and Apollo News for accepting Merz's rhetoric. In a sustained retrospective, Köppel assigns the war's causes to NATO expansion, Western efforts to weaken Russia and alleged mistreatment of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. He questions whether the invasion can be unequivocally classified as unlawful aggression, invokes minority assistance, self-determination and preemptive-war arguments, and calls Putin defensive rather than the aggressor. He alleges that a US–Ukraine deal in November 2021, tentatively the 17th, envisaged retaking Crimea and could have produced a Russian–NATO clash; he does not name or quote the document. He acknowledges his earlier criticism of Putin's invasion and miscalculations and later explicitly says Russia shares responsibility. His closing argument favors dialogue and inclusion of Russian perspectives, rejects an imperial-restoration explanation, relays brief Tokayev praise, and repeats his warning that the Western approach risks a wider war and authoritarian EU rule. Legal conclusions, causal explanations and predictions remain his assessments.

Russia's February 24, 2022 attack on Ukraine is revisited in the retrieved accounts. Köppel calls the attack on a smaller neighbor and forcible border changes impermissible, says Putin underestimated the backlash and overestimated Russia, and nevertheless assigns causal responsibility to Western NATO expansion while warning against forcing a nuclear power to surrender. In a separate October 6 editorial return, he contrasts military punishment of the breach with accepting it and finding an agreement, while noting a similar peace preference on the far left. In her June 7, 2022 interview, Merkel calls the February 24 attack brutal, illegal and without justification. She reflects on the failure to build a preventive security architecture and explains her caution over the 2008 NATO bids while expressly rejecting that history as a justification for the invasion. Both condemn the attack; their causal and policy judgments remain distinct and attributed. Köppel's October 7 account again condemns Russia's invasion as an international-law breach, rejects an innocent-West framing and argues for compromise rather than forcing a nuclear power to surrender. His later retrospective invokes the 2014 Crimea dispute and what he describes as hostility toward Russian-speakers as causal background, with non-justification and present-day Ukraine qualifications. These are his interpretations, retained alongside Merkel's distinct assessment. Medvedev's June 24, 2026 retrospective alleges Western militarization and threats from Ukraine, invokes Article 51 and presents the February 2022 launch as necessary self-defense after failed alternatives. This opposed legal and causal account is preserved alongside Merkel and Köppel. In his October 8 commentary, Köppel questions an unequivocal unlawful-aggression classification and advances minority-assistance, self-determination and preemptive-war arguments. He portrays Putin as defensive and blames Western policy and alleged mistreatment of Russian-speakers, while acknowledging Putin's miscalculations, his own earlier criticism of the invasion and Russia's shared responsibility. This legal challenge differs materially from his earlier express condemnation; neither position is rewritten or treated as an established legal finding.