Europe's defence and reform Gentiloni's Rome discussion

Date unknown

Radio Radicale carries Alessandra Sardoni's complete Rome discussion of Paolo Gentiloni's Diventare una potenza with Guido Crosetto, Monica Maggioni and Stefano Cappellini. Crosetto says the El Mundo account of a CIA warning about Russian ship-launched drone attacks is not confirmed by Italy or the other governments concerned; he explicitly distinguishes this from saying there is no Russian threat. He describes Poland building an 800-kilometre defensive line and recalls a rejected Zelenskyy peace proposal involving internationally controlled territory, which he considers a serious negotiating basis. Neither the proposal's date nor a formal rejection is identified. Crosetto argues that national spending alone cannot provide timely defence, advocates interoperability and a continental arrangement beyond the EU's 27, and says he has written to fellow ministers. His proposed participants include Britain, Norway, Switzerland, former Yugoslav countries and Ukraine after the war. He also urges joint European action on energy, critical materials, research and productive capacity, warning that technological decline threatens wealth, welfare and democracy. His claim that the AI gap cannot be closed is his assessment. Gentiloni recalls a NATO dispute after Crimea's annexation over sanctions and continued dialogue, including Kerry's return from meeting Putin in Sochi and a ministerial breakfast. He leaves judgment of the rival approaches to historians. He describes SAFE's €150 billion and joint-borrowing and procurement incentives, urges larger common financing and a European treasury, and warns that separate national rearmament would magnify fiscal disparities. He advocates willing-country groupings, ending national vetoes and a federation of nation-states. He rejects compromise on support for Ukraine while acknowledging the difficulty of financing defence and protecting welfare. Maggioni describes U.S.–Chinese technological competition, argues that European talent needs scale and common action, identifies cloud computing, robotics and clean technology as opportunities, and defends wise regulation and taxation as democratic protections. She interprets Vance's earlier Munich free-speech criticism as a cover for technology companies' opposition to European taxes and rules. Cappellini criticizes what he sees as anti-European and Russia-friendly positions in both Italian coalitions, particularly the League and Five Star Movement, and contests Conte's portrayal of a fabricated Russian threat. These are their attributed political interpretations. Crosetto's later answer alleges daily cyberattacks, data theft and bot-supported disinformation, predicts that quantum technology will break encryption, and urges responses below the attribution threshold. He cites Russian wartime losses and long-term demographic dangers as reasons to change Europe's defensive mindset; his figures and forecasts are not independently established here. Gentiloni criticizes Aspides' limited mandate and unanimity requirements and urges Italian credibility on both eastern and Mediterranean security. Stating that he has no official responsibility or special information, he supports responding in cyberwarfare but urges great caution over physical aerial incursions. He concludes by urging pro-Europeans to campaign openly, invoking the Brexit campaign and claimed subsequent regret while identifying Trumpian anti-EU ideology as a current source of pressure. The discussion establishes public arguments and proposals, not a new defence organization, agreed retaliation policy, disbursement or completed military operation.

TSN, citing El Mundo, reports that U.S. intelligence warned European governments about possible Russian hybrid attacks on Spain, France or Italy. The reported scenario involves Gerbera drones with a range of up to 600 kilometers launched from Russian vessels to inflict damage or political and economic disruption. The account says warnings followed CIA Director John Ratcliffe's Moscow visit; Trump called the trip routine, while press reports linked it to fears of an attack on an ally. These are attributed threat assessments, not confirmation that an attack occurred or that Ratcliffe delivered a particular warning to Putin. AUF1's September 24 account also attributes the warning to El Mundo and the CIA, but emphasizes that the newspaper presented no evidence in the account it describes. The broadcaster frames such warnings as psychological preparation for war. That is AUF1's interpretation; the footage does not independently confirm or disprove the intelligence assessment. AUF1's September 25 follow-up supplies the ship-launched-drone scenario and says there is no public CIA confirmation. It reports Italian and French pushback and quotes Guido Crosetto saying the warning is unconfirmed and warning against adding fuel to the fire. Müller-Mertens then speculates that such reports may be part of a strategy of tension involving false-flag actions. The official responses are distinct from both the original intelligence allegation and AUF1's unsubstantiated covert-strategy theory. Vremya's September 27 roundup repeats the El Mundo scenario and airs Macron saying French intelligence received no CIA alert about it. His full qualification is retained: increasing tensions and hostile actions in Europe remain concerning. This addresses the reported notification, without proving that no threat exists. The retrieved September 24 TF1/France 2 interview supplies Macron's original qualified response: he denies CIA notification, cites the Italian defense minister's denial and warns that hostile acts and tensions are increasing. This dates the official response without establishing the date of the original reported intelligence warning or independently confirming or disproving the alleged scenario. Radio Radicale's September 24 Rome discussion adds Crosetto's full firsthand response: he says Italy and the other named governments have no confirmation of the specific El Mundo account, but explicitly does not deny a possible Russian threat. He argues that Russian weapons already used in Ukraine would not require ships near Italy to reach European countries. Gentiloni agrees that the particular report lacks evidence while emphasizing that hybrid warfare is real. This supplements the reported warning and earlier retellings without establishing a confirmed plot, notification or absence of all threats.