Baldy questions capabilities Attribution, MAD and space

Oct 5

Baldy asks whether delayed Russian attribution in the Signal-phishing and Leipzig cases reflects thoroughness or capability gaps. Selen describes dependence on partner services for technical detection and disruption, incomplete access to how intelligence products were generated and consequent delays; he explicitly treats the cited cases as hypothetical examples rather than confirming their precise mechanisms. Rosenberg explains the new MAD law’s practical effect in Lithuania: a permanent MAD office, protection beyond the former mission-and-installation limits, cooperation with the local AOTD, expanded instruments and relaxation of the old dual Bundeswehr nexus, alongside Constitutional Court requirements and coordination with other German services. Finally Jäger says the BND monitors developments in space, particularly China, Russia and the United States, works closely with the Bundeswehr and briefs the government. The exchange establishes assessments and cooperation, not the deployment alleged in the question about foreign space weapons.

Asked about rapidly changing space activity, Jäger says the BND closely monitors China, Russia and the United States, considers the risk of Germany falling behind and works intensively with the Bundeswehr while briefing the government. His October 5 reply describes intelligence monitoring and cooperation. It neither independently confirms the question’s claim of deployed US space weapons nor announces a German weapon or satellite deployment.